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I. INTRODUCTION
It is no surprise that the press, in exercising its traditional first
amendment freedom, often discloses truthful information about indi-
viduals that those individuals would prefer to keep private. An inevita-
ble tension exists between the public's right to know and the
individual's right to be let alone.' What is surprising, however, espe-
1. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890). Louis Brandeis
and Samuel Warren first coined the phrase "right of the individual to be let alone" and designated
it as central to the meaning of the right to privacy. They wrote, "the protection afforded to
thoughts, sentiments, and emotions, expressed through the medium of writing or of the arts, so far
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cially given the historic recognition of both a free press and individual
privacy as rights fundamental to the preservation of American society,2
is that the privacy interests of the individual almost always lose.3
The prevalent rationale for this lopsided result is that the first
amendment protects the values promoted by press freedom and that
any infringement of these values consequently warrants the strictest
scrutiny by the courts.4 The values promoted by privacy, on the other
hand, are general liberty interests within the fifth and fourteenth
amendments that, when threatened, deserve only due process balanc-
ing.' Some legal scholars, therefore, have claimed that the public disclo-
sure tort,' which gives individuals a cause of action against a publisher
of embarrassing private facts of no legitimate public interest, is facially
invalid.7 Nevertheless, recent Supreme Court decisions reflect, and most
as it consists in preventing publication, is merely an instance of the enforcement of the more gen-
eral right of the individual to be let alone." Id. at 205. But see Kalven, Privacy in Tort
Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326 (1966). For the best
general treatment of privacy, see A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967). The most provocative
current studies of privacy are: S. BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION
(1983); K. SHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS (1988); Bloustein, Privacy As an Aspect of Human Dignity:
An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1964); Epstein, Privacy, Property Rights, and
Misrepresentations, 12 GA. L. REV. 455 (1978); Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE
L.J. 421 (1980); Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1989).
2. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2609 (1989) (stating that "press freedom and
privacy rights are both 'plainly rooted in the traditions and significant concerns of our society' ")
(quoting Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975)).
3. As Justice Byron White proclaimed in his Florida Star dissent, "the trend in 'modern'
jurisprudence has been to eclipse an individual's right to maintain private any truthful information
that the press wished to publish." Id. at 2619 (White, J., dissenting).
4. See, e.g., id. at 2609-10; New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); see also
infra note 29.
5. For the clearest extended analysis of this separation of rights in the jurisprudential philos-
ophy of Alexander Meiklejohn, see Bloustein, The First Amendment and Privacy: The Supreme
Court Justice and the Philosopher, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 41, 42-61 (1974). For Meiklejohn's own
analysis of privacy and the freedoms of press and speech, see infra notes 21-29 and accompanying
text; and for evidence of the influence of Meiklejohn's view on the Supreme Court, see infra notes
18-20 and accompanying text.
6. See Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960). Prosser wrote: The public disclosure
tort generally requires that "something secret, secluded or private pertaining to the plaintiff" be
invaded and that the something be publicized; but, it does not require the publication to be false,
or to be for the commercial advantage of the defendant. Id. at 407. The Restatement (Second) of
Torts codified this public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977) (applying the tort to the giving of "publicity to a matter
concerning the private life of another" that is "highly offensive to a reasonable person and is not of
legitimate concern to the public").
7. See Franklin, A Constitutional Problem in Privacy Protection: Legal Inhibitions on Re-
porting of Fact, 16 STAN. L. REV. 107 (1964). Other commentators who have noticed the potential
unconstitutionality of a public disclosure tort include T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF
ExPRESSION 517 (1970) and Kalven, supra note 1, at 336. See also Kapellas v. Kofman, 1 Cal. 3d
20, 35, 459 P.2d 912, 922, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360, 370 (1969); Hall v. Post, 323 N.C. 259, 372 S.E.2d 711,
715 (1988).
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scholars recognize, a constitutionally based privacy right, but suggest
that the first amendment may give publishers of private truthful infor-
mation a complete defense of privilege."
The analytical premises of the Court's first amendment model,
however, do not necessitate that the Court always subordinate individ-
ual privacy to press freedom. Instead, these premises actually support a
first amendment interest in protecting the privacy of the individual,
thereby preserving the public disclosure tort remedy.9 Thus, cases con-
cerning the public disclosure of private facts pose a difficult constitu-
tional dilemma: courts must choose between two opposing claims, both
of which arise not from conflicting constitutional provisions, but from
the first amendment. As a result, the Court should balance these com-
peting claims with equal scrutiny and on a level playing field.
This Note re-evaluates the Court's own model of the first amend-
ment and shows that under its model, the Court errs when it summarily
dismisses an individual's privacy interest in favor of a publisher's claim
of first amendment privilege. If both claims arise from the same consti-
tutional provision and both merit strict scrutiny, then the Court must
accommodate both claims without denying either one its unique protec-
tion under the first amendment. Part II of this Note examines and criti-
cizes the classic democratic model of the first amendment. Part III
recommends amending the model to accommodate protection of indi-
8. The Court constantly has claimed that the majority currently does not accept this com-
plete defense for publishers. Justice Thurgood Marshall has stated: "Nor need we accept appel-
lant's invitation to hold broadly that truthful publication may never be punished consistent with
the First Amendment. Our cases have carefully eschewed reaching this ultimate question ....
Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2608. The line of cases from New York Times, 376 U.S. at 254, to
Florida Star, however, may make one question the sincerity of the above statement; for example,
as Justice White states, "If the First Amendment prohibits wholly private persons. . . from recov-
ering for the publication of the fact that she was raped, I doubt that there remain any 'private
facts' which persons may assume will not be published in the newspapers, or broadcast on televi-
sion." Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2618 (White, J., dissenting); see also infra subpart II(A) and Part
IV.
9. See infra notes 47-50 and 54-63 and accompanying text. For a comprehensive introduction
to model theory, see C. HEMPEL, ASPECTS OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION 155-71 (1965). According to
Carl Hempel, models are intellectual constructs, formed by a synthesis of familiar arguments and
views, that "cannot be found in reality" but with which "concrete phenomena can be compared for
the purpose of explicating some of their significant components." Id. at 156. The notion that legal
principles or legal constructs possess an internal logic all their own, exhibiting what Hempel refers
to as a "modeling" of reality, is not a novel idea in legal scholarship. See L. JAFFE, ENGLISH AND
AMERICAN JUDGES As LAWMAKERS 38 (1969) (noting that the "judge must believe in the validity of
the reasons given for the decision at least in the sense that he is prepared to apply them to a later
case which he cannot honestly distinguish"); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitu-
tional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 19 (1959) (stating that a "principled decision, in the sense I have in
mind, is one that rests on reasons with respect to all the issues in the case, reasons that in their
generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is involved"). For an excellent
current example of the use of model theory in legal analysis, see Fallon, The Ideologies of Federal
Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141 (1988).
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vidual privacy. Part IV then analyzes a particular application of the
amended model to the Supreme Court's recent excursion into this area
in Florida Star v. B.J.F.'0 Finally, Part V briefly assesses the state ac-
tion concerns relating to the amended model proffered in this Note.
II. THE CLASSIC DEMOCRATIC MODEL OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
MEIKLEJOHN REVISITED
A. Meiklejohn, New York Times v. Sullivan, and the Democratic
Model
Justice Louis Brandeis, in his legendary concurrence in Whitney v.
California," eloquently argued that democratic society must value free
speech "both as an end and as a means."' 2 Free speech is an intrinsi-
cally valuable goal because it is a manifestation of the ultimate purpose
of government: to free its citizens so that they may pursue self-fulfill-
ment.'3 As a means, free speech is an indispensable check on political
integrity and truth. 4 Generally speaking, since Justice Brandeis set
forth the competing models, two schools of thought have emerged in
the literature-one that views the freedom of speech as noninstru-
mentalist and self-oriented 5 and another that views it as instrumental
10. 109 S. Ct. 2603 (1989).
11. 274 U.S. 357 (1927). For an insightful treatment of Brandeis's first amendment jurispru-
dence and a fair, but sustained, attack on Bork's analysis and modifications of Brandeis's theories,
see Garfield, Twentieth Century Jeffersonian: Brandeis, Freedom of Speech and the Republican
Revival (in manuscript) (1990). But cf. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20 (1971) [hereinafter Bork, Neutral Principles] (arguing that "there
should be no constitutional obstruction to laws making criminal any speech that advocates forcible
overthrow of the government or the violation of any law"). See generally R. BORK, THE TEMPTING
OF AMERICA 333-36 (1990) [hereinafter R. BORK, TEMPTING AMERICA] (same).
12. Justice Brandeis wrote:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to make
men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government the deliberative forces should
prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means. They believed
liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty. They believed
that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the
discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion
would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the
dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people;
that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of
the American government. . . .Believing in the power of reason as applied through public
discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law-the argument of force in its worst form.
Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the Constitution
so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed.
Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375-76 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
13. Id. (Brandeis, J., concurring).
14. Id. (Brandeis, J., concurring).
15. See, e.g., S. BENN, A THEORY OF FREEDOM (1988); T. EMERSON, supra note 7, at 6 (stating
that "freedom of expression is essential as a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment"); J. RAz,
THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986); M. REDISH, FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION (1984); Baker, Realizing
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to democratic government."6
The Supreme Court adopted the instrumentalist model, which val-
ues free speech because it is essential to democratic government, in
New York Times v. Sullivan.17 In its opinion the Court emphasized a
national commitment to unrestrained public debate."8 By adopting the
instrumentalist model, the Court recognized that a general interest on
the part of the citizenry to be informed political participants is implicit
in the public's commitment to free speech. The Court's model rests on
the premise that free speech provides citizens with access to the ingre-
dients critical to successful self-governance.' 9
As Justice William Brennan acknowledged, the Court developed its
self-governance model for protecting first amendment freedoms in light
of the work of Alexander Meiklejohn.20 Meiklejohn characterized first
amendment protections as fundamentally public in nature.2 ' Freedom
Self-Realization: Corporate Political Expenditures and Redish's The Value of Free Speech, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 646 (1982); Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L.
REV. 964 (1978); Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982) [hereinafter
Redish, Value of Free Speech]; Redish, Self-Realization, Democracy and Freedom of Expression:
A Reply to Professor Baker, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 678 (1982); Scanlon, Freedom of Expression and
Categories of Expression, 40 U. PITT. L. REV. 519 (1979); see also infra notes 45-49 and accompa-
nying text. The major criticism of this theory is that its scope protects too much expression be-
cause any expression can render one more autonomous. Distinguishing freedom of speech from
other liberties that are important to individual autonomy, such as the right to a job or an educa-
tion, is also difficult. If the goal is self-autonomy, then all forms of expression and all liberties that
render one more autonomous demand a heightened protection, a heightened protection tradition-
ally reserved for only political speech. See infra note 50; see also F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A
PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 56 (1982); Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 11, at 25.
16. See, e.g., R. BORK, TEMPTING AMERICA, supra note 11; A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM
(1960); BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance and
Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299 (1978); Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 11; Fiss,
Why the State, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1987); Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The
Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191; Meiklejohn, Public Speech
and the First Amendment, 55 GEO. L.J. 234 (1966); Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Abso-
lute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245. The major critiques of this influential model are presented in subpart
II(B) of this Note.
17. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
18. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, emphasized that the Court "consider[ed] this
case against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement,
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." Id. at 270.
19. See Red Lion Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (stating that free speech
gives citizens "access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences. .. "); see
also Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 41 (1971).
20. See Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First
Amendment, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1965); see also Kalven, supra note 16.
21. In Meiklejohn's classic formulation, "The First Amendment does not protect a 'freedom
to speak.' It protects the freedom of those activities of thought and communication by which we
'govern.' It is concerned, not with a private right, but with a public power, a governmental respon-
sibility." Meiklejohn, supra note 16, at 255. Meiklejohn continued:
[T]he title "Bill of Rights" is lamentably inaccurate as a designation of the first ten amend-
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of speech under this view is not a private right, but a public power.
According to Meiklejohn, the citizenry in a democratic system oc-
cupy a dual role as the "majority" and as "individuals." 2 The majority
does not delegate its powers of government to its elected agents, but
retains sovereignty while enlisting the aid of its agents as servants
charged with carrying out the majority's will. To function properly in
its capacity as sovereign, the majority must have access to the informa-
tion necessary to direct its agents appropriately.2' The characterization
of the majority as sovereign and the government as servant compels a
recognition of the right of the people to criticize their leaders and to
forbid censorship by the government of information necessary to self-
governance.4
On the other hand, the people as private individuals do not have
governing powers but only private rights that limait the exercise of gov-
ernmental powers by their elected agents. While the majority's power of
self-governance is absolute and any government interference should re-
ceive the strictest of scrutiny, the individual's rights as a private citizen
are unrelated to majority self-governance. Therefore, these private
rights should be protected only to the extent that they outweigh the
government's need to interfere. 5
In other words, Meiklejohn's analysis bifurcates the interests of the
citizens into those interests necessary to the people's power as gover-
nors, which deserve absolute protection, and those interests of each citi-
zen as an individual, which the government may regulate limited only
by the requirement of due process. 26 The subsequent inference seems
clear and is made cursorily in the literature:27 specifically, freedom of
the press belongs to the former category of interests while the individ-
ual's right to privacy, the right to control or conceal information about
ments. They are not a "Bill of Rights" but a "Bill of Powers and Rights." The Second
through the Ninth Amendments limit the powers of the subordinate agencies [Congress and
the States] in order that due regard shall be paid to the private "rights of the governed." The
First and Tenth Amendments protect the governing "powers" of the people from abridgement
by the agencies which are established as their servants. In the field of our "rights," each one
of us can claim "due process of law" [under the Fifth Amendment]. In the field of our gov-
erning "powers," the notion of "due process" is irrelevant.
Id. at 254 (emphasis added).
22. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 16, at 37-38, 115.
23. As Professor Frederick Schauer has pointed out, this proper functioning entails "the ne-
cessity of making all relevant information available to the sovereign electorate so that they ...
can decide which proposals to accept and which proposals to reject." F. SCHAUER, supra note 15, at
38.
24. Id. at 38-39.
25. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 16, at 37-38, 115; see also Bloustein, supra note 5, at 42-
51.
26. A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 16, at 37-38.
27. See supra notes 20-22.
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oneself, belongs to the latter category of interests. This model seems to
explain nicely the superlatives that the Court attaches to press free-
dom 8 and the lopsided results in favor of press freedom over competing
individual interests.
29
B. Critiques of the Democratic Model
1. Majority Determination of Free Speech Protections
Any instrument is only as effective as the person or persons who
wield it. The same holds true for the instrumental model of free speech
protections articulated by the Court in New York Times v. Sullivan.30
Under the rubric of Meiklejohn's classic democratic model, the majority
wields the instrument of free speech. This model uncritically assumes
that to preserve its freedom of speech, the majority need protect itself
only from its agents, the federal and state governments.3 1 Because the
value of free speech lies in its function as an instrument for ascertaining
and implementing the majority's will, it follows that when the sovereign
decides through the democratic process to limit the protections of free
speech, this model provides no logical check to stop it.
32
28. See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2609-10 (1989).
29. The line of Supreme Court cases dealing with these competing interests is rather meager.
Justice Marshall describes this area of the law as "somewhat uncharted" and in marked contrast to
"the well-mapped area of defamatory falsehoods." Id. at 2607 n.5. Nevertheless, in support of the
Court's holding in Florida Star, Justice Marshall cited Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S.
469 (1975), Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977), and Smith v. Daily
Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979), all of which accord the press ample first amendment
protection at the expense of the individual privacy interests at stake. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at
2607.
30. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
31. See Partlett, From Red Lion Square to Skokie to Fatal Shore: Racial Defamation and
Freedom of Speech, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 431 (1989); Welch, The State As a Purveyor of
Morality, 56 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 540 (1988).
32. See F. SCHAUER, supra note 15, at 40. Professor Schauer has noted:
If the people collectively are in fact the sovereign, and if that sovereign has the unlimited
powers normally associated with sovereignty, then acceptance of this view of democracy com-
pels acceptance of the power of the sovereign to restrict the liberty of speech just as that
sovereign may restrict any other liberty. Moreover, there is no reason to say that the sover-
eign may not entrust certain individuals with certain powers [such as powers to limit freedom
of speech]. The power to delegate authority is implicit in the unlimited power that sover-
eignty connotes.
Id.; see also L. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 50-58 (1986).
Arguably, the amendment process itself establishes the majoritarian underpinnings of the
Constitution and, thereby, the first amendment. For example, the first amendment could be
amended to protect all speech except speech advocating the violent overthrow of the United
States. See Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 11, at 20. Thus, any adequate model of the first
amendment must admit its democratic foundation. The additional requirement of an amendment
to the Constitution, a "super majority," however, cannot be based solely on majoritarian values,
and any adequate model of the first amendment must also admit, in this sense, its republican,
countermajoritarian foundation.
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The democratic model of Meiklejohn naively assumes that the ma-
jority as sovereign is rational and tolerant and poses no threat to the
well-being of the individual citizen. This assumption ignores the diffi-
culty posed by the situation in which, after dialogue and open debate,
the majority determines that certain speech is intolerable and charges
its agents with implementing the sovereign's will by eradicating the un-
desirable speech. The classic democratic model would seem to suggest
that refusing to uphold a decision reached through legitimately demo-
cratic procedures threatens the freedom of the people to govern
themselves."3
According to the Court's accepted model, therefore, the first
amendment should protect the citizens from the government in its role
as the electorate's agent but not from the government when it carries
out the will of the majority of the electorate. Ironically, those commen-
tators who emphasize the nonmajoritarian protections afforded by the
first amendment defend the importance of the first amendment's core
values on the basis that those values represent the majority's will.3 4
33. Professor Lee Bollinger identified this deepest of difficulties for the democratic model
when he wrote:
But if the people themselves, acting after full and open discussion, decide in accordance with
democratic procedures that some speech will no longer be tolerated, then it is not "the gov-
ernment" that is depriving "us," the citizens, of our freedom to choose but we as citizens
deciding what the rules of conduct within the community will be. Then the "democracy" has
functioned, and it may be asked whether it does not "[strike] at the very heart of [a] democ-
racy" to say that the citizens cannot choose to make that decision.
L. BOLLINGER, supra note 32, at 50-51. The lineage of this idea can be traced back at least as far as
John Stuart Mill. Mill stated:
It was now perceived that such phrases as "self-government" and "the power of the people
over themselves," do not express the true state of the case. The "people" who exercise the
power are not always the same people with those over whom it is exercised; and the "self-
government" spoken of is not the government of each by himself, but of each by all the rest
. . . . and in political speculations "the tyranny of the majority" is now generally included
among the evils against which society requires to be on its guard.
J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 62 (G. Himmelfarb ed. 1984) (1st ed. 1859).
34. Compare New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (Brennan, J.) and Brennan,
supra note 18 (emphasizing the majoritarian model of Meiklejohn) with Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the core of first amendment
protections are nonmajoritarian).
This lapse in conceptual clarity may explain the Court's continuing difficulties in formulating
a consistent approach to the intractable problem of the hostile audience; that is, whether
majoritarian interests embodied in the hostile audience's response should override the speaker's
right to speak. Compare Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) and Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15 (1971) (implying in dicta that audience response, no matter how hostile, cannot chill the
speaker's right to speak) with Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) and Feiner v.
New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (holding that the first amendment does not protect speech that
incites a crowd to riot, a hostile audience problem). If the response on the part of the audience or
the public can determine an individual's right to speak, then the protections of speech under the
first amendment have all but vanished. The tort remedy of public disclosure is required precisely
to prevent the chilling effects of the hostile audience problem. See infra notes 55-64 and accompa-
nying text.
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2. Lack of Protection for Extremist Speech
Recognition of the intolerant majority has led some modern schol-
ars to rethink and refocus the speech protections afforded to the indi-
vidual, possibly by aligning the government, from which the first
amendment protects citizens under the classic democratic model, as a
buffer between the individual and the hostile crowd. 5 An adequate
model of the first amendment accordingly must protect each citizen
from the unjustified interference of the majority as well as unjustified
government interference; the model cannot rely on majoritarian values
for its sole justification. 6 The central value promoted by the first
amendment seems to lie closer to a societal ethic of tolerance3 7 or an
attitude of experiment, 38 even if the majority disapproves of the indi-
vidual views expressed.
3 9
Also troublesome is that the democratic model logically entails only
the protection of speech and the transmission of information that is
related to self-governance, namely, political speech.40 While Meiklejohn
did not restrict the protection of speech to mere political speech be-
35. See Partlett, supra note 31, at 466-73; Welch, supra note 31, at 555-57.
36. See L. BOLLINGER, supra note 32, at 79-86, 182-83; Partlett, supra note 35.
37. L. BOLLINGER, supra note 32, at 197 (protecting what Professor Bollinger terms "extrem-
ist speech").
38. Professor Martin Redish has stated:
[V]iewed from the broad perspective of history, any attempt by the government to lock in a
prevailing scientific consensus is likely to be either futile or dangerous . . . . [S]uch attempts
undermine both the search for knowledge and the development of a free and open exchange
of information and opinion, traditionally deemed central values served by the right of free
expression.
Redish, Product Health Claims and the First Amendment: Scientific Expression and the Twi-
light Zone of Commercial Speech, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1435, 1443 (1990); see also Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974) (stating that "there is no such thing as a false idea [under the
first amendment]").
39. Compare this attitude of nonmajoritarian experiment with Judge Bork's analysis when he
wrote:
The Constitution creates a republican form of government in which political speech is essen-
tial to arrive at consensus on various issues. Majorities make up their minds and either do or
do not enact laws. In such a government, speech advocating the forcible overthrow of the
government and the seizure of power by a minority has no value because it contradicts the
premises of constitutional democracy.
R. BORK, TEMPTING AMERICA, supra note 11, at 333-34. According to Professor Bollinger, however,
speech, or more precisely "extremist speech," that lacks majoritarian and democratic value still is
protected by the core first amendment value of toleration. Professor Bollinger noted that "it is not
the absence of social value that determines whether the principle of free speech is applicable;
indeed, the perceived absence of value is, if anything, a major reason for protection, or, more accu-
rately, for toleration. ... ." L. BOLLINGER, supra note 32, at 182.
40. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text; see also Bork, Neutral Principles, supra
note 11, at 20, 26-29, 31. In fairness to Judge Bork, he has abandoned the crabbed position that
confines constitutional protections to only political speech. See R. BORK, TEMPTING AMERICA, supra
note 11, at 333-36.
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cause he saw cultural expression as beneficial to self-government,41 the
purists of his position have criticized the extension of first amendment
protections to the penumbras of political speech.42 If the deeper values
promoted by the first amendment, however, are instrumental not only
to majority self-governance but also to the establishment of an ethic of
general tolerance irrespective of the majority's approval or disap-
proval,43 then the first amendment must be read more broadly than the
classical view suggests. Instead, its protections should encompass not
only extremist political speech that advocates the forcible overthrow of
the very system that protects it, but also many forms of individual self-
expression that are not, strictly speaking, political speech.44
3. No Incorporation of Individual Autonomy
Under an instrumentalist's scheme in which all values serve other
values, a final question that the classic democratic model must answer
is why promote democracy at all? If freedoms of speech and press are
instrumental to the functioning of the democratic process, what value
does democracy serve in turn? It is circular to argue that democracy
serves as a better system if by "better" one means more democratic or
encouraging more democracy, 45 and empirically the proposition that de-
mocracy is a more efficient form of government is highly doubtful.46
The reason for promoting democracy, according to Professor Mar-
tin Redish, is that the democratic system is process oriented, not neces-
sarily more efficient.47 The process orientation of democracy increases
the value of individual autonomy.4 The ultimate value of democracy is,
therefore, the self-realization of the individual.49 If the classic model is
41. Meiklejohn theorized that "the people do need novels and dramas and paintings and
poems, 'because they will be called upon to vote.'" Meiklejohn, supra note 16, at 263 (citation
omitted).
42. Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 11, at 26-29, 31. But cf. R. BORK, TEMPTING
AMERICA, supra note 11, at 333.
43. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
44. See L. BOLLINGER, supra note 32, at 151-58, 182. But see Bork, Neutral Principles, supra
note 11, at 31.
45. Redish, Value of Free Speech, supra note 15, at 602 (asking "[h]ow are we to decide
what is 'better'? Higher gross national product? More international influence? And better for
whom? Elites? A Majority? Oppressed minorities?").
46. Redish stated, "[I]t is doubtful that we could establish empirically that throughout his-
tory democracies have fared better than other forms of government. After all, we do know that the




49. Id. at 603-04. Professor Ruth Gavison commented:
Privacy is also essential to democratic government because it fosters and encourages the
moral autonomy of the citizen, a central requirement of a democracy. Part of the justification
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forced to recognize personal autonomy as the ultimate goal of democ-
racy and, therefore, necessarily a core value of the first amendment,50
then the model's internal premises necessitate protecting and promot-
ing the individual. The question that remains is whether the protec-
tions now afforded the individual under the classical democratic model
include the privacy interests of the individual originally thought by
Meiklejohn to be excluded from the core protections of the first
amendment.
This analysis comes full circle back to Justice Brandeis's original
claim that democratic society must protect free speech both as a means
and as an end.5 1 Freedoms of speech and press are indispensable means
to democracy, but they also serve the final end of having individuals
control their own destinies. Perhaps the ultimate weakness of the classi-
cal model is that it disregards the importance of the first amendment as
an intrinsically valuable goal of democracy, in favor of preserving only
the function of the first amendment as a means to democratic rule.
Refocusing first amendment analysis by adopting a broader vision
of first amendment protections is not meant to deny the explanatory
force of Meiklejohn's model of the first amendment. The effectiveness
of the model, however, seems to depend on assumptions that when
closely analyzed push the commitments of the model away from pro-
tecting the citizen as the majority and toward protecting the citizen as
an individual. If the above analysis is accurate, then a model that tradi-
tionally has not afforded first amendment protections to the citizen as
an individual must be modified. Part III develops an amended
Meiklejohn model, one that incorporates individual privacy interests
into the first amendment calculus.
for majority rule and the right to vote is the assumption that individuals should participate in
political decisions by forming judgments and expressing preferences. Thus, to the extent that
privacy is important for autonomy, it is important for democracy as well.
Gavison, supra note 1, at 455. The model of first amendment protections developed in Part III will
follow closely the analysis of the three concepts of democracy, privacy, and autonomy in the above
passage.
50. Many different interpretations have been given to the argument for autonomy, which
faces difficult problems, see supra note 15, such as rewriting the Court's analysis of economic
rights long ago repudiated in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), so that gauging how to
incorporate self-realization into Meiklejohn's model remains difficult. Part III of this Note at-
tempts this incorporation.
51. See supra note 11.
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III. PRIVATE FACTS AND THE ZONE OF DELIBERATION: MEIKLEJOHN
AMENDED
A. After the Receipt of Information and the Zone of Deliberation
Although the Court has never set out the elements of the
Meiklejohn model, the model's operation would seem to require two
separate stages. The first stage concerns the protection of the transmis-
sion of information from speaker to listener. The current Court's first
amendment jurisprudence is concerned almost exclusively with protect-
ing this first stage of activity. The protection of the citizen during the
transmission of information to the listener is the protection of the citi-
zen as part of the self-governing majority analyzed in Part 11.52
The second stage in the process under Meiklejohn's model is the
individual's application of the information received to the individual
decisions of self-governance. The current Court's first amendment juris-
prudence almost entirely ignores this deliberation stage of the model.
Both stages of the process, however, are needed to achieve what, in the
Court's view, the Constitution envisions: free individual choice by each
citizen.
In the context of the first stage of communicating information from
speaker to listener, the Court has recognized that inhibiting or chilling
the participation of individuals in a system of free speech and press
diminishes the self-governing rights of at least those individuals.
5 3
Therefore, it has applied the first amendment to forestall those poten-
tial inhibitory effects. At the same time, however, the Court has ne-
glected the freedom from inhibition at the second stage-the listener's
subsequent deliberation-which begins after the communication be-
tween speaker and listener is complete. The Court implicitly assumes
that speech need only reach the listener's ear for the freedoms of speech
and press under the democratic model to operate successfully.54
A possible reason for the Court's disregard of the model's second
stage is that the threat of inhibition at the second stage is much harder
to imagine than the threat of inhibition at the first stage. If public dis-
approval of unpopular beliefs causes inhibition, then speakers in the
first stage are obviously vulnerable. By making their beliefs public,
52. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1, 6 (1971); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S.
589, 604 (1967); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965). But see Laird v. Tatum,
408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972).
54. The Court often has used the phrase "right to receive information and ideas," e.g., Klein-
dienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969), but it has
invoked the right only to protect the act of communication between speaker and listener.. The




these speakers invite antipathy and perhaps suppression.
The second stage of the model, in contrast, occurs entirely within
the mind of the individual, who attracts no attention by deliberating.
The private nature of the activity insulates the individual from the po-
tential of a hostile public response. Perhaps a hostile public would in-
hibit unpopular decisions that the individual reaches if the deliberation
process were known, but how can the public discover the substance of
an individual's deliberations unless the information used and the exper-
iences considered are made public? The insulation of an individual
from the chilling effect of public disapprobation of deliberations and
experiences is accomplished by preventing this public knowledge about
the particular individual.
Privacy is precisely the name that the public disclosure tort cases
give to the individual right to control information about oneself.55 Pro-
fessor Ruth Gavison, while defining perfect privacy in terms of secrecy,
anonymity, and solitude,58 concludes that the common analysis of all
privacy liberties is that privacy enables individuals to think and act
freely without public hostility or humiliation.57 This proposition mirrors
the hostile audience problem identified in the first stage and equally
inhibits the democratic decision-making process.
58
Privacy understood in this special sense-as control of personal in-
formation to avoid the hostile audience problem-can be identified as
the individual's zone of deliberation. This zone of deliberation is a nec-
essary prerequisite to the operation of the second stage of the Court's
democratic model-application of public information to decisions of
self-governance-at least if that second stage is to operate free from
inhibition as the Court firmly has guaranteed at the first stage of the
same model.
Justice William 0. Douglas, in his dissent in United States v. Cald-
well,5 9 seems to have anticipated the two stages of the democratic
model proffered in this Note. Justice Douglas acknowledged
Meiklejohn's first amendment model and then identified two principles
that he derived from the model: First, the need to guarantee individual
55. See, e.g., Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973) (involving schoolchildren's disruptive be-
havior); Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940) (concerning a genius's decline);
Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 289-90, 297 P. 91, 92-93 (1931) (involving a plaintiff's former
career as a prostitute); see also Prosser, supra note 6, at 392-98. For a critique of the public disclo-
sure tort, see Kalven, supra note 1, at 333-39.
56. Professor Gavison described perfect privacy as a situation in which "no one has any in-
formation about X [secrecy], no one pays any attention to X [anonymity], and no one has physical
access to X [solitude]." Gavison, supra note 1, at 428.
57. Id. at 451.
58. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
59. This case is one of three cases consolidated in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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liberty to hold and experiment with individual beliefs and opinions
through a blanket protection of privacy, and second, the disabling effect
that inhibition of the free flow of information has on the ability of indi-
viduals to perform self-governance.6 0 Justice Douglas's first principle is
analogous to the second stage of Meiklejohn's model as proposed here,
and his second principle is analogous to the first stage.
One simple observance of privacy's importance to self-governance
is the curtain on the voting booth, but the shelter of privacy is needed
for more than the casting of the formal vote. Individuals register self-
governing choices through methods other than vote casting. Moreover,
the process of reaching a decision does not take place only at the mo-
ment of formal choice registering; it is a continuous process that begins
with the receipt of each item of information from a speaker and con-
cludes with each choice, formal or informal, that the citizen registers.1
An individual who listens and decides in a glass house is coerced by
public opinion, regardless of whether anyone actually looks in the win-
dows. If every magazine read, every rally attended, or every conversa-
tion engaged in might somehow become a matter of public knowledge,
the individual would feel inhibited.2 The pressure is analogous to that
felt by members of the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP) in Alabama when they feared that their
membership would be publicized."'
Even though the Court sometimes has recognized that the public
disclosure of private facts chills an individual's ability to make self-gov-
60. Id. at 714-15. After quoting from Meiklejohn, Justice Douglas wrote:
Two principles which follow from this understanding of the First Amendment are at
stake here. One is that the people, the ultimate governors, must have absolute freedom of,
and therefore privacy of, their individual opinions and beliefs regardless of how suspect or
strange they may appear to others. Ancillary to that principle is the conclusion that an indi-
vidual must also have absolute privacy over whatever information he may generate in the
course of testing his opinions and beliefs. . . . The second principle is that effective self-
government cannot succeed unless the people are immersed in a steady, robust, unimpeded,
and uncensored flow of opinion and reporting which are continuously subjected to critique,
rebuttal, and re-examination.
Id.
61. For a sample of the most cogent arguments that privacy reflects a psychological need of
individuals to keep some core of personality to themselves, outside the notice of society, see H.
ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 22-78 (1958); E. GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EvERY-
DAY LIFE (1959); A. WESTIN, supra note 1, at 8-63; Gavison, supra note 1, at 444-55; Bloustein,
supra note 1, at 1002-03; Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 743; Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at
205; cf. Meiklejohn, supra note 16, at 255-57.
62. Bloustein, supra note 1, at 1003; see also Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560,
573, 255 N.E.2d 765, 773, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647, 658 (1970) (Breitel, J., concurring).
63. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (stating that "[t]his Court has recognized
the vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations" and that
"[i]nviolability of privacy in group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to
preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs").
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erning decisions,"' inhibition of self-governance can be accomplished
just as effectively by eroding the protections of the individual's zone of
deliberation, as by inhibiting the flow of information to the listener
through public debate." If the democratic model is to be maintained,
an interest in protecting the privacy of the individual clearly exists
under the first amendment. The democratic model cannot allow its so-
ciety to open the curtain to expose the individual and still to expect the
participatory scheme to survive.
B. The Symmetry of Protections: The Accommodation of Private
Facts and Public Interests
If privacy consists primarily of the individual's controlling, or keep-
ing secret, personal information, then the first amendment interest in
privacy will extend only to certain types of information: that informa-
tion which, if released, would inhibit the individual's freedom to reach
decisions concerning self-government. This confining of privacy inter-
ests to include only private facts necessary to decisions related to self-
governance seems vulnerable to a critical analysis similar to that in Part
II, which demonstrated the lapse in conceptual clarity by those com-
mentators who would limit the protections of speech to only political
speech. This restricted view of privacy interests would seem to ex-
clude the most private of private facts from protection because intimate
facts often are unrelated to the individual's ability to reach uninhibited
decisions of self-governance.6 7
The analysis in this Note presumes that both the public's interests
in press and speech freedoms and the individual decisionmaker's inter-
ests in privacy are related directly to the promotion of the same first
amendment values of self-government and tolerance. Consequently, if
the individual's privacy protection diminishes when the particular inti-
mate facts are not related directly to individual self-governance, then,
to preserve the model's symmetry, protection of the public's interest in
knowing these facts should diminish correspondingly because the facts
equally are unrelated to informed majority rule. The legitimate public
interests of the citizens as a majority under this model are restricted to
the function of informing the public on issues of self-governance to the
same extent that privacy interests are restricted by those issues. Public
curiosity does not create a legitimate public interest unless the informa-
64. Id.; see also Louisiana v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961).
65. See supra notes 55-64 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
67. For example, the fact of being a rape victim is unrelated to decisions concerning self-
governance. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2609 (1989).
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tion transmitted relates to the function of citizens in their sovereign
capacity. 8 A reduced privacy interest entails a greater public interest
only if the different interests promote different concerns. This assump-
tion no longer can be maintained given the analysis herein.6 9
In addition, the disclosure of private information and facts by itself
does not inhibit an individual's privacy or deliberation unless linked to
the identification of that individual. Most suits for injury caused by
public disclosure of private facts have focused on the single issue of
identification.70 Thus, society can accommodate the competing first
amendment claims of the publisher and the individual in public disclo-
sure cases if private information relevant to the self-governing choices
of the public is transmitted, but the identity of the subject of that in-
formation is not.7 1 With the heightened protection afforded to the pri-
vacy interests of the individual as decisionmaker under this amended
model, publishers will have to be careful that the information they are
about to publish really relates to issues of self-governance and does not
identify a private individual in a manner which inhibits that individ-
ual's decision making. But does this newly required scrutiny on the be-
half of publishers lead to self-censorship and to the eventual chilling of
the publication of legitimate public interests and issues?
72
Certainly the first line of inquiry, identifying legitimate public is-
sues, is one that the Court has avoided repeatedly by deferring to the
press. 73 This deference can be attributed to the erroneous assumption
that if the information is in the news, then the information is news-
worthy.74 The Court's assumption, however, is intellectually inconsis-
tent with the deeper understanding of the Court's own model.7 By
68. Bloustein, supra note 5. Professor Bloustein has contended:
"Public interest," taken to mean curiosity, must be distinguished from "public interest,"
taken to mean value to the public of receiving information of governing importance. There is,
to be sure, a constitutionally protected right to satisfy public curiosity and publish lurid gos-
sip about private lives. But this, in Meiklejohn's terms, is a limited or qualified fifth amend-
ment right, to be distinguished from the absolute or unqualified first amendment right of the
public to learn about those aspects of private lives which are relevant to the necessities of
self-government.
Id. at 56-57.
69. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
70. See supra note 55.
71. For a similar method of accommodation of first amendment protections, see Bloustein,
supra note 5, at 56-61.
72. The Court and commentators often raise this difficult problem of self-censorship. See,
e.g., Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2610; F. SCHAUER, supra note 15, at 168-73; see also infra notes
111-15 and accompanying text (analyzing self-censorship in Florida Star).
73. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2611; see Bloustein, supra note 5, at 77-94.
74. See infra notes 106-08 and accompanying text; see also Bloustein, supra note 5, at 57.
But see Kalven, supra note 1, at 336.
75. See infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
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deferring to the press, the Court undermines the deliberation stage of a
workable Meiklejohn model of the first amendment.
While distinguishing legitimate public interests from purely private
information is necessary for the purpose of intellectual consistency, a
proper assessment is extremely difficult to perform. 76 Possibly a second
line of inquiry would avoid the inconsistency and lessen the difficulty of
this assessment. A plausible and fairly simple rule would be a presump-
tion against freedom of speech and press for publishers who link the
transmission of the information to the identification of a private indi-
vidual. The identification of the individual is rarely relevant to the pur-
poses of self-governance. The presumption effectively would bar
identification if it is reasonably likely to inhibit the individual deci-
sionmaker by exposing private facts.
Of course, cases exist in which the identity of a person involved in
an event is itself relevant to the purposes of self-governance, as when
the person holds a public office or a place in the public eye. 77 While this
scenario seems to unbalance the neat symmetry of first amendment
protections afforded to press and privacy under the presented model, in
many cases the identification of the subject of a published news item is
not of significant value. The identity of the subject, in contrast to the
substance of the information, is unlikely to influence the reader's politi-
cal choices. When the identity of the subject is legitimately in the pub-
lic interest the symmetry of first amendment protections is not broken
because the individual in these cases is identified with the government,
an agent of the majority, and thus, the first amendment protections of
press and privacy no longer are counterpoised. Under the amended
model of Meiklejohn, the government is subject to majoritarian re-
straints when the private individual, both as a member of the self-sov-
ereign majority and as an individual self-governing decisionmaker, is
not subject to those restraints.78
If the plaintiff in a public disclosure case is not well known, publi-
cation of the fact or event satisfies the public's first amendment inter-
est; the first amendment interest of plaintiffs is satisfied if the
76. For the most comprehensive attempt at calculating what properly constitutes the concept
of public interest, see Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion,
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARv. L. REV. 603 (1990).
77. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (expanding the category of public
issues to include information about public figures); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964) (including in the category of public issues information about public officials). But see Wol-
ston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111
(1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (narrowing the category of public figure). See
generally Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967
Sup. CT. REV. 267.
78. See supra subpart II(A).
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publisher refrains from identifying them. Thus, the public, including
publishers, has no valid constitutional objection to preserving a tort
remedy for plaintiffs if the given publisher does identify, and thereby
injure, the plaintiff. The Court, however, can reach this result only if it
addresses the constitutional privilege to tell the public a piece of news
separately from the symmetrical and competing constitutional privilege
to refrain from publicly identifying the person involved.7 9
Evaluating the constitutionality of a given public discourse suit
should include a calculation of which result will best serve the total sys-
tem of first amendment protections, a system of which both the press
and the individual are a part and to which both appeal. The Court's
end calculation may favor publication, but the Court should engage in
the actual process of calculation and not accept blindly a blanket asser-
tion that the privileged publication of "newsworthy" items of informa-
tion always serves the first amendment best. At least with regard to
identification, as suggested above, the calculation of effect on a system
of free expression might produce the opposite result. If so, the Court
cannot invalidate automatically under the first amendment a public
disclosure tort action addressed to the unauthorized publication of
identities.
IV. CLIMBING BACK UP THE SLIPPERY SLOPE: FLORIDA STAR V. B.J.F.80
The paradigm scenario for interference with the core privacy inter-
ests in the first amendment would be the public disclosuie of private
facts that inhibit or chill the individual's decision making on matters of
self-government and that link the identity of the private individual to
those private facts."' As yet the Supreme Court has not faced this para-
digm case. 2 Florida Star v. B.J.F.,3 the latest case in a meager line of
Supreme Court cases dealing with privacy and first amendment issues, 4
most resembles the paradigm scenario.
A. The Factual Background of Florida Star v. B.J.F.
Florida Star concerned a newspaper in Florida that published the
name of a rape victim in violation of state law85 as well as the publica-
79. See supra notes 54-63 and accompanying text.
80. 109 S. Ct. 2603 (1989).
81. See supra notes 70-79 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 29.
83. 109 S. Ct. 2603 (1989).
84. See supra note 29 (citing sparse case law in this area).
85. 79 FLA. STAT. § 794.03 (1987). The statute in its entirety provides:
Unlawful to publish or broadcast information identifying sexual offense victim-No person
shall print, publish, or broadcast, or cause or allow to be printed, published, or broadcast, in
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tion's own internal policy. 6 B.J.F. was raped at knifepoint in 1983. She
reported the crime to the sheriff's office, and she filed a report. Under
Florida law, the report was confidential and not available for public in-
spection.8 7 Nevertheless, the sheriff's department inadvertently allowed
a reporter from the newspaper access to the report. The reporter then
copied the information verbatim. 88
State law charged the newspaper with the statutory confidentiality
of the report and prohibited transcribing its confidential portions.""
Furthermore, the reporter who obtained the information testified that
signs in the press room stated that publishing the name of a rape victim
is unlawful.90 The reporter also knew when she copied the full name of
B.J.F. that the newspaper had a policy against identifying victims of
sexual offenses. At trial the reporter acknowledged that she was not
supposed to copy the name of a rape victim from a police report.9 1
Nonetheless, she copied the information.
The newspaper subsequently published an account of the rape that
identified B.J.F.'s full name, address, and telephone number.92 At the
time of publication, no adversarial proceeding had begun, and the po-
lice had not identified or apprehended a suspect.93 Shortly after the
newspaper had printed the story, while B.J.F. was in the hospital, a
man called her mother and threatened to rape B.J.F. again.4 Because
of the publicity and the telephone calls, B.J.F. required police protec-
tion, changed her address and telephone number, and sought mental
health counseling for her emotional distress. B.J.F. sued both the sher-
iff's department9 5 and The Florida Star.
The trial court found that The Florida Star recklessly disregarded
B.J.F.'s privacy rights96 and awarded her compensatory and punitive
damages against the newspaper totaling one hundred thousand dol-
any instrument of mass communication the name, address, or other identifying fact or infor-
mation of the victim of any sexual offense within this chapter. An offense under this section
shall constitute a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082, §
775.083, or § 775.084.
Id.
86. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2606.
87. Id. at 2606.
88. Id. at 2605-06.
89. Id. at 2606.
90. Id. at 2616 (White, J., dissenting).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 2606.
93. Id. at 2608.
94. Id. at 2606.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2616 (White, J., dissenting).
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lars.9 7 On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that the
imposition of civil damages on the newspaper, pursuant to the Florida
statute, violated the first amendment.98
The plaintiff in Florida Star was not a public official or a public
figure. The private facts that were published were not in the public do-
main prior to the negligent handling of the crime report by the sheriff's
office and the reckless copying of that report by the reporter from The
Florida Star. The report clearly revealed the plaintiff's identity, but the
facts identifying B.J.F., though clearly of the highest intimate nature to
her, were arguably not facts that, if disclosed, necessarily would inhibit
B.J.F.'s decision making on matters of self-government. Given the
amended model of first amendment protections developed in Parts II
and III, publishing the information of the crime, but withholding the
name of the victim, would have accommodated the interests of press
freedom and privacy.9 If the Supreme Court consistently had applied
the model that it adopted in New York Times v. Sullivan,100 the Court
would have upheld the judgment against The Florida Star. What were
the reasons for the Court's reversal; what went wrong?
B. Analysis of the Court's Holding in Florida Star v. B.J.F.
The Supreme Court found the rule of Smith v. Daily Mail Publish-
ing Co.101 to be controlling in Florida Star.10 2 In Daily Mail the Court
held that a state cannot penalize the publisher of true, publicly signifi-
cant information, unless the state has a compelling interest in keeping
the information private.103 The Court elaborated on its acceptance of
Daily Mail's strong presumption in favor of press protection by identi-
fying several considerations. First and foremost, the Constitution pro-
tects an overarching public interest in disseminating truth.0 4 This
concern, of course, restates the importance of protecting the first stage
of the Meiklejohn model. 05 The protections entailed by the second
stage of the Meiklejohn model, the zone of deliberation, should counter-
97. Id. at 2606.
98. Id. at 2605.
99. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
101. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
102. 109 S. Ct. at 2609.
103. The ruling in Daily Mail states, "[I]f a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information
about a matter of public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publica-
tion of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order." Id. (quoting
Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103 (alteration in original)).
104. Id.
105. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
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balance the Court's reasoning. 106 Thus, B.J.F. should have a cognizable
claim that the privacy of that information is also important to her deci-
sion making; exposure of the information inhibits her ability to deliber-
ate freely.
The privilege with respect to the transmission of information in the
model's first stage only pertains to legitimate public issues. The Court
found that the article in The Florida Star generally was of significance
to the public.10 7 To support this rather vague assessment, Justice
Thurgood Marshall stated that once factual matter is available to the
public, the Constitution prohibits the restraint of its publication. 08 On
its face, this argument is clearly erroneous. The argument contends that
if some item of information makes its way into the public domain, then
the item is legitimately a public issue. The argument is inconsistent
with the fundamental justification for press protections in the Court's
first amendment model-the instrumental function of the press in
transmitting information to the sovereign citizenry for informed major-
ity rule.
The information that identifies B.J.F. as a rape victim does not
pertain to self-governance. Even if the information was only generally
of public significance-meaning only that information pertaining to the
crime of rape in general informs the citizenry of certain politically sig-
nificant social arrangements-could not a publisher disseminate the sig-
nificant information by reporting the facts of the crime without
identifying the name and address of the victim? That the right to ap-
preciate the general significance of the information could have been
protected without reporting the specifics of B.J.F.'s name and address
seems obvious.
The Court noted that the Daily Mail holding only protects the
publication of lawfully obtained information. 09 Justice Marshall stated
that even if the sheriff's office failed to keep B.J.F.'s identify confiden-
tial as required by the Florida statute, the law cannot punish the good
faith" recipient of the information."' Under Florida law, however, po-
106. See supra Part III.
107. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2611.
108. Justice Marshall, quoting Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103, wrote, "once the truthful infor-
mation was 'publicly revealed' or 'in the public domain' the court could not constitutionally re-
strain its dissemination." Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2610 (citation omitted).
109. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2609.
110. Id. at 2610-11.
111. Id.; see also Ashdown, Good Faith, the Exclusionary Remedy, and Rule-Oriented Adju-
dication in the Criminal Process, 24 WM. & MARY L. REv. 335 (1983); Mertens & Wasserstrom,
The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the
Law, 70 GEo. L.J. 365 (1981); cf. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (adopting a good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule).
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lice reports that reveal the identity of a rape victim are not among the
matters that the public, by law, is entitled to inspect. That the reporter
who copied the information was fully aware that Florida law prohibited
her from transcribing it or taking it from the sheriff's office is also
significant.
Justice Marshall's final reason 12 for applying Daily Mail to Florida
Star v. B.J.F. was the concern that penalizing the publication of factual
information would make the press reluctant to report sensitive factual
information even if that information is clearly of interest to the pub-
lic.113 Given the fallibility of the courts, a rule penalizing factual falsity
often may penalize truth.14 The mere risks of the cost and inconven-
ience of litigation, as well as the uncertain damages that might incur,
will lead publishers not to publish information, even if that information
is true."
15
Clearly, the public has no legitimate interest in receiving intimate
information concerning the personal affairs of purely private citizens;
this knowledge cannot illuminate the citizenry about matters of self-
government. Contrary to the Court's assumption, self-censorship by the
press can be avoided by developing a framework to distinguish private
from public information." 6 A presumption against the publisher's press
freedom should arise when a news item identifies a purely private indi-
112. After summarily dismissing the state's interests of encouraging victims of rape to report
the crime, providing for the physical safety of the victims, and protecting the victim's right to
privacy, Justice Marshall listed three independent reasons for applying the rule in Daily Mail to
this case. First, the newspaper justifiably relied on the sheriff's department, and thereby, the infor-
mation was obtained lawfully. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2611-12. In this case, however, the re-
porter knew that she was acting against Florida law and, as argued above, information making its
way into the public domain is not transformed consequently into a public issue. Second, Justice
Marshall was concerned that the per se negligence rule of the Florida statute did not meet even
the reasonable person standard in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D. Id. at 2612. The legisla-
ture by prohibiting the public disclosure of such information, however, clearly established a strong
general presumption of reasonable care. Third, Justice Marshall found the Florida statute underin-
clusive because it applies only to the mass media and not to local gossip. Id. at 2612. On the other
hand, as Justice White responded, the statute fit within the larger body of tort law in Florida,
which does include the traditional public disclosure tort covering local backyard gossip. Id. at 2617
(White, J., dissenting) (stating that "the Court's 'underinclusiveness' analysis itself is 'under-
inclusive' ").
113. Id. at 2610. Professor Schauer recognized the importance of this argument in his discus-
sion of defamation. F. SCHAUER, supra note 15, at 170-71.
114. F. SCHAUER, supra note 15, at 170.
115. Id. at 170-71.
116. Professor Schauer has stated that "[k]nowledge as to the affairs and past of purely pri-
vate persons serves little if any public purpose." Id. at 176. With respect to tort law for the inva-
sion of privacy, Schauer continued, the dangers of self-censorship of public issues, the only kind of
censorship forbidden under the Court's model, are not present because "purely private speech
involves no such problems, and developing legal principles and rules to separate the public from
the private is central to both enforcing the Free Speech Principle and keeping it within its proper
scope." Id. at 177.
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vidual and links that individual to private facts that, when exposed,
would inhibit that individual's self-governing decision making. Publish-
ing the facts or events in question satisfies the publisher's press free-
dom; withholding the name and personal identifying facts satisfies the
privacy interest of the individual.
The ruling in Daily Mail not only is inapplicable to the facts of
Florida Star, but also strikes the wrong balance between the competing
interests of the public's right to know and the individual's right to be
let alone. The rule essentially ignores the second stage of the model of
the first amendment on which it is based.
117
V. CONCLUSION
Although the analysis of privacy in the first amendment presented
in this Note suggests a more symmetrical, balanced constitutional doc-
trine, the end result is limited. This privacy interest arises within the
constitutional structure of a free expression system. In every case of
public disclosure, the publisher will assert free expression claims that
serve the same system. Because individual privacy is secured only at
the expense of the free speech right of the publisher, it cannot expand
beyond certain limits. Even under the amended model the first amend-
ment privacy interest exists only to prevent the identification of an in-
dividual with published information and then, only after weighing the
net effect on the free expression system.
An individual cannot assert a constitutional privacy claim directly
against a private publisher who threatens to infringe the individual's
privacy through publication." 8 Instead, the individual must rely on the
indirect protection of a common-law tort suit," 9 after the offending
117. See supra Part III. Justice White in his dissent in Florida Star, quoting Judge Merrill,
wrote:
Does the spirit of the Bill of Rights require that individuals be free to pry into the unnews-
worthy private affairs of their fellowmen? In our view it does not. In our view, fairly defined
areas of privacy must have the protection of law if the quality of life is to continue to be
reasonably acceptable. The public's right to know is, then, subject to reasonable limitations so
far as concerns the private facts of its individual members.
Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2618 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1112,
1128 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976)).
118. Of course, if a state agency publishes the information, that publication presumably is
state action. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 721-26 (1961). In that
event, individuals could assert their first amendment rights against the state directly by claiming
state inhibition of freedom of decision making.
119. If the legislature codified the public disclosure tort in a state statute, one might argue
that a refusal by the state courts to enforce the resulting state right of privacy itself may be suffi-
cient state action to create federal jurisdiction. If the lack of a tort constitutes a conspicuous lack
of state regulation, the deficiency itself might serve as evidence of state action. See, e.g., Reitman
v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
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publication. Moreover, not all states recognize a public disclosure tort
in their common law;120 in those that do not, the individual would have
no mechanism through which to assert a claim for protection. 2 '
On the other hand, this analysis of privacy in the first amendment
directs attention to the one form of privacy that the law, both statutory
and constitutional, so far has been unable to protect successfully: the
noncorporeal right to control information about oneself. Furthermore,
the analysis suggests how privacy in that form might be integrated into
a system of constitutional rights. The focus on the importance for pri-
vacy of information in the deliberation process, regardless of its con-
tent, is perhaps the distinguishing contribution of this first amendment
approach to privacy analysis.
A first amendment analysis of privacy teaches that applying free
speech guarantees exclusively to speakers will not protect the system of
free expression adequately; decisionmakers must be sheltered, too. For
the protection of privacy, the analysis herein yields a constitutional in-
terest that cannot always be vindicated because it must compete with
conflicting constitutional interests arising from the same logic. Yet the
nature of privacy itself causes its entanglement with other social and
legal interests and values. The first amendment analysis of privacy
makes these entanglements and compromises explicit while at the same
120. A majority of courts that have considered the issue have recognized a public disclosure
tort. See, e.g., Dunlap v. McCarty, 284 Ark. 5, 678 S.W.2d 361 (1984); Forsher v. Bugliosi, 26 Cal.
3d 792, 608 P.2d 716, 163 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1980); People v. Home Ins. Co., 197 Colo. 260, 591 P.2d
1036 (1979); Wolf v. Regardie, 553 A.2d 1213 (D.C. 1989); Cape Publications v. Hitchner, 549 So.
2d 1374 (Fla. 1989); Baker v. Burlington Norther, 99 Idaho 688, 587 P.2d 829 (1978); Bush v.
Maine Say. Bank, 387 A.2d 1127 (Me. 1978); Tower v. Hirschhorn, 397 Mass. 581, 492 N.E.2d 728
(1986); Young v. Jackson, 572 So. 2d 378 (Miss. 1990); Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159
S.W.2d 291 (1942); M & R Investment Co. v. Mandarino, 103 Nev. 711, 748 P.2d 488 (1986); Eddy
v. Brown, 715 P.2d 74 (Okla. 1986); Tollefson v. Price, 247 Or. 398, 430 P.2d 990 (1967); Industrial
Found. of the South v. Texas Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1976); Cowles Publishing
Co. v. Washington, 109 Wash. 2d 712, 748 P.2d 597 (1988); Zinda v. Louisiana Pacific Corp., 149
Wis. 2d 913, 440 N.W.2d 548 (1988). Some courts have not recognized a public disclosure tort
because of a presumed conflict with the first amendment. See, e.g., Hall v. Post, 323 N.C. 259, 372
S.E.2d 711 (1988). See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 804 (4th ed. 1971).
121. But see supra note 118. The notion of individuals' dependence on state laws to protect
their federal constitutional rights is less startling than it seems; even the right to free speech de-
pends to an extent on state laws prohibiting, for example, assault and battery. If state law did not
protect a speaker from an angered listener's physical violence, or if a newspaper could not use state
law to prevent its equipment from being destroyed by a displeased audience, freedom of speech
and of the press effectively would be curtailed. See also McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the
Founders' Design, 54 U. CHi. L. REV. 1484 (1987) (arguing that the original structure of the Consti-
tution protected the most essential individual rights only under state law); Stewart, Federalism
and Rights, 19 GA. L. REV. 917 (1985) (same).
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time clarifying the claims to be balanced and the process to be used in
balancing these competing claims.
James R. Beattie, Jr.*
* I would like to thank Professor David F. Partlett who has guided me on this circuitous
journey and my wife, Valinda Valdez-Beattie, who has chosen anew each day to travel with me.
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